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 The Smallest Salable Patent Pricing Unit (SSPPU) is a valuation method 
used as a preliminary step towards the calculation of fair, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory (FRAND) royalties for licenses over Standard-Essential 
Patents (SEPs).   Under SSPPU, royalties should reflect the value added to 
the smallest salable component implementing the patented invention.   In 
this paper, we discuss policy making proposals to convert SSPPU into a 
pricing rule that not only assists the assessment of SEPs added-value, but 
also forces the specification of royalties terms as a share of component costs 
in SEP licensing negotiations.  We call this new rule SSPPU+ and we show 
that it distorts the distribution of surplus between SEP owners and 
implementers by laying down a hidden revenue-cap on standardized 
technologies.  Furthermore, SSPPU+ imposes uniform pricing of SEPs 
across different industries and does not allow SEP owners to take benefit of 
complementarities between technologies.  This pleads against a 
generalization of SSPPU+ at early standardization and negotiation stages. 
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Fixing royalties for licenses over Standard-Essential Patents (SEPs) is a 
complex issue.   Owners of SEPs usually commit to license their technology 
of fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.  However, what 
constitutes a FRAND royalty is a matter of debate, both in economic theory 
and in legal scholarship.1  Several valuation methods compete to guide the 
determination of appropriate royalties for SEPs in private negotiation and 
litigation before courts.    
The Smallest Salable Patent Pricing Unit (SSPPU) is one of them. 
Under SSPPU, royalties should reflect the value added to the smallest 
salable component implementing the patented invention.  In recent years, 
some Standard Setting Organizations like IEEE have envisioned to convert 
SSPPU into a pricing rule that not only assists the ex post assessment of 
SEPs added-value by courts in the context of patent litigation, but also 
forces licensing parties to ex ante specify royalties terms as a share of 
component costs in SEP negotiations.  We call this evolution of SSPPU 
towards a more specified component base at the contract formation stage 
SSPPU+.  This new pricing method would purportedly replace current 
methods that specify running royalties as a percentage of the entire market 
value (EMV) of the end product.   
When royalties are expressed as percentage, as is common industry 
practice in the ICT sector, the choice of a royalty basis is a priori irrelevant.  
Whichever of the component’s value or of the product’s end market value is 
specified, the per unit revenue for the SEP owner should be the same if the 
royalty percentage can be adapted.  As a matter of fact, a change in the 
royalty basis from EMV to smallest salable component can be compensated 
by an inversely proportional change in the royalty rate to keep the patent 
holder’s revenue constant.  And, even if behavioral constraints may bias the 
parties’ evaluation in one direction or the other depending on the reference 
point (the so-called anchoring effects), parties are still bargaining to share 
the entire amount of surplus.  Therefore, a change in the royalty basis 
should be of little importance.   
This, however, no longer holds true if there is a nominal limit in the 
royalty percentage.  In this paper, we argue that high nominal royalty rates 
are de facto impossible to implement.  Therefore, a change in the royalty 
basis is not neutral as parties are no longer bargaining over the entire 
surplus.    
To understand this, recall that royalty negotiations are taking place in 
                                                
1 Gregory J. Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 94 JOURNAL OF 
COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS, 931-1055 (2013). 
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the shadow of litigation.  In a FRAND litigation context, courts determine a 
valuation method for SEPs. Usually, this consists in fixing a royalty rate 
and a royalty basis.  However, if parties ex-ante use component licensing in 
contractual negotiations – for example because this is recommended or 
required by an SSO – path-dependent courts are likely to follow this choice, 
and determine a royalty rate only.  The royalty basis discussion does not 
even enter the scope of the trial.  Behavioral bias, including anchoring or 
unit effects, are likely to lead courts and juries to consider that high nominal 
royalty rates are “big”, eventually prohibitive, while low nominal rates are 
more likely to look “fair”.   
This, however, is misguided.  Courts must determine a fair valuation for 
a given SEP, not a fair royalty unit.  When a high-valuation SEP is 
practiced by a low value component, this calls for a high percentage royalty 
(or, in the alternative, a low unit percentage with a larger royalty base, like 
EMV).  But behavioral constraints make high nominal royalty rates under 
SSPPU+ look unfair.  Moreover, antitrust agencies may deem high nominal 
rates a form of unlawful exploitative pricing.   
Against this backdrop, SSPPU+ sets a de facto price cap on royalty 
rates.  Combined with a given royalty basis, it is equivalent to a hidden 
revenue cap on a SEP holder licensing revenue.  This revenue cap may 
prevent the SEP owner to collect a fair value for its innovations.  In this 
paper, we show that under SSPPU+, the revenue cap operates as a haircut 
on the bargaining range.  Therefore, parties in licensing negotiation do no 
longer bargain over the entire surplus but only for a fraction of it, the 
remaining being systematically captured by the licensee.  This is likely to 
create inefficiencies.   
Furthermore, if the patented technologies are used in multiple 
application sectors, SSPPU+ leads to more uniform pricing of standardized 
technologies across industries while efficiency would call for a valuation 
that reflects the value-added to each industry and especially the 
complementarities between industry-specific technologies.  These important 
distributional effects are likely to impact the strategies of technology 
developing firm are developing technologies and the standardization 
process itself.  We argue that this cuts against a generalization of SSPPU+ 
at early standardization and negotiation stages. 
Our paper builds on several economic studies that criticize SSPPU as a 
basis for licensing because it is at odds with current industry practices and 
its generalized implementation is complicated. The main arguments are as 
follows. First, in industries where portfolio licensing is a common practice, 
SSPPU requires to map each patent to a well-identified component and to 
determine its individual value.  With large portfolio of SEPs and non-SEPS, 
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this valuation exercise is likely to create substantial transaction costs.2  And 
complementarities between patents within a similar portfolio are ignored 
under SSPPU.   
Second, the smallest component in the SSPPU must be “salable” but it 
does not mean that it is actually sold.  This is particularly problematic when 
firms are vertically integrated.3  For those firms, there are no proper 
metering variables and the requirement to use the smallest salable 
component as a rule is likely to lead to different royalty bases depending on 
their level of integration   SSPPU is thus likely to create discrimination 
among patent users i.e. it might be more difficult to enforce the no-
discrimination rule imposed by FRAND licensing.   
Third, manufacturers create value by combining components and part of 
this value comes from complementarity between technologies.  A 
technology has added value beyond the component where it is included.  
Using the end-market value as the industry norm for licensing can be 
justified by the necessity to take these complementarities into account.4   On 
the contrary, licensing at the component level fails to take these network 
effects into account. Sidak therefore recommends the use of the EMV as a 
royalty base when multiple technologies interact.   
The debate on the opportunity to use SSPPU in SEP licensing echoes 
scholarly discussions on the appropriate choice of a royalty base.  The 
pioneering work of Kamien and Tauman compare a fixed fee licensing to 
royalties and they show that the former is superior by creating less 
distortions on the product market.5  San Martin and Saracho and Llobet and 
Padilla compare ad-valorem and per-unit royalties with the first being 
equivalent to using the EMV as the royalty basis and the later the 
component value.6  Both papers show that the choice of a royalty basis 
influences downstream market competition.  San Martin and Saracho 
characterize the choice of ad-valorem royalties as a commitment to be softer 
in the market competition game, therefore increasing the firms’ profits.   
Llobet and Padilla show that the choice of a royalty basis influences the 
                                                
2 Richard J. Stark, Debunking the Smallest Salable Unit Theory, 7 CPI ANTITRUST 
CHRONICLE, 1-10 (2015).  
3 Jonathan D. Putnam and Tim A. William, The Smallest Salable Patent-Practicing 
Unit (SSPPU): Theory and Evidence, available at SSRN (2016). 
4 Gregory, J. Sidak, The Proper Royalty Base for Patent Damages, 10 JOURNAL OF 
COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS, 989-1037 (2014). 
5 Morton Y. Kamien and Yair Tauman, Fees versus Royalties and the Private Value of 
a Patent, 101 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 471-492 (1986).   
6 Marta San Martin and Ana I. Saracho, Royalty Licensing, 107 ECONOMIC LETTERS, 
284-287 (2010).    
Gerard Llobet and Jorge Padilla, The Optimal Scope of the Royalty Base in Patent 
Licensing, 59 JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 45-73 (2016).   
 SSPPU AND COMPONENT LICENSING (Nov. 2018)  5 
licensor’s revenue, its incentive to invest and ultimately economic welfare. 
Therefore, per-unit royalties based on the component’s value and ad-
valorem royalties based on handsets’ market value are generally not 
equivalent.  In line with Sidak, they show that ad-valorem royalties are 
more desirable when complementary technologies are combined.7  
The paper is organized as follow.   In Section II, we discuss the 
valuation methods for SEPs used in courts and SSOs and we track the 
emergence of SSPPU+.   In Section III, we show that the choice of a royalty 
basis is mostly irrelevant when the royalty rate can be adjusted. In Section 
IV, we show that SSPPU+ is equivalent to a revenue cap on royalties.   In 
Section V, we show that SSPPU+ is equivalent to uniform pricing of 
standardized technologies across sectors and industries and discuss possible 
consequences.  We conclude in Section VI.    
 
II. FROM SSPPU VALUATION IN DAMAGE LITIGATION TO COMPULSORY 
COMPONENT LICENSING IN LICENSING NEGOTIATIONS 
 
In US and EU law, compensatory damages are due to patent owners in case 
of infringement.8  Patent damages are set ex post on a case-by-case basis by 
judicial authorities and/or in arbitration proceedings.  As a rule, damages 
should be “appropriate to the actual prejudice suffered by him/her as a 
result of the Infringement”.9  And in no event, damages should be “less than 
a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer”.10  
The law focuses a standard damages inquiry on either the patent 
owner’s lost profits11 or – and this is more frequent – on “the amount of 
royalties or fees which would have been due if the infringer had requested 
authorization to use the intellectual property right in question”.12  In the 
second variant, the idea is to set a reasonable royalty.  When an established 
royalty or fee is unavailable, the examiner attempts to reconstruct the 
outcome of a hypothetical negotiation between the patent owner and the 
infringer.   
Courts use a variety of methods to calculate patent damages.  In CSIRO 
v Cisco, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit noted that “damages 
                                                
7 Sidak, Supra note 4.   
8 See 35 U.S. C. § 284 and Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights ('EU 
Enforcement Directive'), Article 13(1). 
9 EU Enforcement Directive, Article 13(1). 
10 35 U.S. C. § 284. 
11 Lost profits cover lost sales, price erosion effects, and additional costs like litigation 
expenses for instance.  
12 See EU Enforcement Directive, Article 13(1)(b). 
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models are facts dependent”.13   A central tenet of patent law is that 
damages should reflect “the value attributable to the infringing features of 
the [infringing] product and no more”.14  This is known as the rule of 
“apportionment”.15  But when multi-component products are involved 
apportionment can be tricky.  In such cases, damages claimants have two 
options.  First, they may propose to use the entire market value of an end-
product as the appropriate royalty base when the patented component is the 
“basis for demand” for that entire product.16   The following point in the 
inquiry consists in finding a reasonable royalty rate – a flat or percentage 
fraction of the end product price – that captures the incremental value 
brought by the patented invention to the end product.  In contrast, when the 
patented invention does not exclusively drive demand for the end product, a 
more realistic point for the royalty base may be the value of the component, 
sub assembly or integrated circuit that implements the patent claim. The 
inquiry thus uses the value of the “smallest salable patent practicing unit” 
(“SSPPU”) as the appropriate royalty base, and in turn attempts to calculate 
a rate that reflects the incremental value of the patented invention.    
In practice, there is some uncertainty on which of EMV or the SSPPU 
should be the default royalty base for the calculation of compensatory 
damages cases.  In the US, decisions of the Federal Circuit suggest “as a 
general matter, [that] the base should not be the ‘entire market value’”.  
However, in CSIRO v Cisco, the Federal Circuit also noted that SSPPU is 
“untenable” as a rule.17  It stressed its derogatory nature, insisting that 
“licensed based evidence” remains the preferred method when rates for 
comparable licenses are available.18 
Courts are, however, more concordant over the fact that the EMV v 
SSPPU discussion is largely irrelevant outside of the specific scenario of 
jury trial cases, and therefore more relevant in the US than in the EU where 
bench trials are the rule.19    This is because jury trials present a “unique 
apportionment concern”.20  When non-expert juries are called to set 
reasonable royalties, use of the EMV method may mislead juries into 
                                                
13 Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation ('CSIRO') v. Cisco 
Systems, 809 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
14 Ericsson v. D-Link, 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
15 This problem occurs essentially in practice with running royalties calculated on units 
produced or sold, as opposed to a lump sum royalty. 
16 Roger D. Blair and Thomas F. Cotter, Intellectual Property: Economic and Legal 
Dimensions of Rights and Remedies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2005). 
17 CSIRO v Cisco, supra note 13. 
18 Though this is very uncommon, see Blair & Cotter, supra note 16, p. 211. 
19 CSIRO v Cisco, supra note 13, a bench trial, was conducted under the EMV. 
20 Mark Snyder, SSPPU: A Tool for Avoiding Jury Confusion, 17 THE SEDONA 
CONFERENCE JOURNAL, (2016). 
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overcompensation by making the claimed royalty look low.  The use of 
such base “cannot help but skew the damages horizon for the jury”21 and 
“make a patentee’s proffered damages amount appear modest by 
comparison”.22  Stark notes that SSPPU was developed to offset a 
“perceived tendency of jurors to overestimate reasonable royalties that 
might be agreed to in hypothetical negotiations”.23   
But the narrow, jury-specific and ex post nature of SSPPU may be 
brought to a whole new level.  As Kappos and Michel note: “it has become 
fashionable to refer to SSPPU as a substantive rule defining the 
appropriate royalty base for all purposes and in all contexts”.24 In 
particular, two strands of uncoordinated policy initiatives could lead to a 
generalization of SSPPU, in particular in ex ante patent licensing 
negotiations.   On the one hand, some prominent Standard-Setting 
Organizations (“SSOs”) have proposed to use of SSPPU as the appropriate 
valuation method in all ex ante patent licensing negotiations over Standard 
Essential Patents covered by a FRAND commitment.25  In 2014, the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association 
(“IEEE-SA”) updated its patent policy and introduced the idea that FRAND 
royalty terms should reflect the “value that the functionality of the claimed 
invention or inventive feature … contributes to the value of the relevant 
functionality of the smallest saleable Compliant Implementation that 
practices the Essential Patent Claim”.   The IEEE-SA initiative is 
predicated on the policy view that SEP royalties are too high and on 
academic concerns of market failures known as “patent holdup” and 
“royalty stacking”.26  In practical terms, the IEEE-SA suggests to links the 
valuation discussion to the smallest component that implements the patent.  
And it proposes to look at the smallest salable component as a proxy for the 
value of the infringing feature, and thus suggests that the sale price or 
purchase cost of a component is the appropriate valuation base. 
Unsurprisingly, the IEEE-SA initiative has received mixed feelings amongst 
practitioners.27   
                                                
21 Uniloc USA v. Microsoft, 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011), at pp. 51-52. 
22 LaserDynamics v. Quanta Computer, 694 F.3d 51 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
23Stark, supra note 4.  
24 David J. Kappos and Paul R. Michel, The Smallest Salable Patent-Practicing Unit: 
Observations on Its Origins, Development, and Future, 32 BERKLEY TECHNOLOGY LAW 
JOURNAL, 1433-1455 (2018).  
25 Note that in some sectors like wireless communications, SEPs licensing occurs on a 
global scale.  The proposed expansion would thus lead to the introduction of SSPPU well 
beyond the US. 
26 Mark A. Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEXAS 
LAW REVIEW, 1991-2049 (2007). 
27 Ron Katznelson, The IEEE controversial policy on Standard Essential Patents – the 
Empirical Record since Adoption, Mimeo (2016).   
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On the other hand, several antitrust agencies have taken initiatives that 
lean towards a generalization of component licensing as the pricing rule for 
bilateral SEP negotiations.  Component licensing means using the SEP 
implementing component as the appropriate royalty base not only for the 
valuation of the technology, but also for the specification of the royalty 
term.  Let us explain this with an example.  Consider a SEP (or a portfolio 
thereof) that covers wireless connectivity technology for airlines’ in-flight 
entertainment sets.  Having calculated the added-value to the smallest 
salable component under the IEEE-SA valuation method, here a radio 
frequency (RF) chipset, the SEP owners and implementers can in principle 
agree to specify the royalty term as a share of the (i) RF chipset, (ii) in-seat 
video screen, (iii) seat, or (iv) the aircraft.  Under component licensing, no 
such freedom exists. The parties are compelled to choose the RF chipset as 
the appropriate royalty base, and specify a royalty term on that base. 
Component licensing-spirited antitrust initiatives follow distinct, 
uncoordinated routes.  In Asia, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) 
has ruled in 2016 that Qualcomm had abused a dominant position by 
refusing to license FRAND-pledged SEPs to modem chipset companies, 
and instead unlawfully followed a practice of licensing its SEPs only at the 
end-user device level.28    In the European Union (EU), a discussion has 
taken place on whether the “ND” limb of FRAND implies that owners of 
SEPs declared to ETSI have a duty to license “at all levels”.29  In relation to 
IoT devices, some studies suggest that percentage royalties on final 
products are not appropriate because the connectivity technology is 
ancillary.  A corollary of that interpretation would be to proscribe SEP 
owners from licensing only at end-user device level.  And in the US, Apple 
is currently complaining before the FTC that Qualcomm calculates royalties 
as a percentage of a handset’s price, even though handsets today offer a 
number of features—including cameras, high-resolution touch-screen 
displays, powerful applications and graphics processors—other than cellular 
connectivity.30  In effect, all those antitrust initiatives bear potential to 
generalize component licensing as the rule in SEP licensing negotiations, a 
more than incremental evolution that was not obvious following the IEEE-
                                                                                                                       
Gregory J. Sidak, Bargaining Power and Patent Damages, 19 STANFORD 
TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW, 1-31 (2015). 
28 https://www.qualcomm.com/documents/kftc-issued-press-release-dated-december-
28-2016-unofficial-english-translation. 
29 Huber, Bertram, Why the ETSI IPR Policy Does Not and Has Never Required 
Compulsory ‘License to All’: A Rebuttal to Karl Heinz Rosenbrock (2017). Available at 
SSRN.    
Rosenbrock, Karl Heinz, Licensing At All Levels Is The Rule Under The ETSI IPR 
Policy: A Response to Dr. Bertram Huber (2017). Available at SSRN.    
30 http://www.fosspatents.com/2017/01/ftc-sues-qualcomm-for-antitrust.html.  
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SA initiative.  This is why we call this evolution SSPPU+.   
In practice, SSPPU+ would augur a sea change in markets where 
portfolio licensing at the end-user device level had been industry practice, 
like wireless communications, medical devices or food ingredients.31   
 
III. SSPPU, THE BARGAINING RANGE AND THE NEUTRAL DISTRIBUTION 
OF ECONOMIC SURPLUS 
 
This section explains that the application of SSPPU in an industry should be 
indifferent from a mathematical standpoint (A). Certainly, the existence of 
behavioral biases leads parties to a SEP negotiation to bargain within a 
different range of nominal valuations for the technology depending on the 
royalty basis (B).  Yet, this effect is of little concern (if anticipated at the 
time of entry in the industry) because it does not affect the distribution of 
economic surplus between SEP owners and implementers (C). 
 
A.  The Neutrality of Multiplication 
 
Let us consider an industry in which a SEP owner and a multi-component 
product manufacturer negotiate percentage royalties.  The total royalty 
revenue that the SEP owner can expect is equal to the royalty rate 
multiplied by the royalty base: 
 
Royalty revenue = royalty rate x royalty base  (1) 
 
From an arithmetical standpoint, any change to the factor royalty base is 
neutral on the product of the multiplication as long as the factor royalty rate 
can be adjusted. This can be shown with a simple example.  Consider a 
standard essential technology that is embodied in a chipset with a cost 
(value) of $10.32   The chipset is integrated in a handset with a retail value 
of $1,000.   Assume that the incremental value brought by the technology to 
the handset is $50, and that both the SEP owner and the handset 
manufacturer agree upon that figure.   The parties can conclude a licensing 
agreement that provides for a 5% royalty rate on the end-product value.  
                                                
31 In the wireless communications sector, royalties are typically calculated on the basis 
of the selling prices of licensed products, rather than as a percentage of the selling price of 
either chipsets or cellular service. See Eric Stasik, Royalty Rates and Licensing Strategies 
for Essential Patents on LTE (4G) Telecommunications Standards, LES NOUVELLES, 114–
119 (2010).   
32 The price of a chipset processing unit is usually between $16 to $18 but baseband 
processors can be sold for between $30 and $40.  
Elizabeth Woyke, The Smartphone: Anatomy of an Industry, The New Press, New-
York (2014). 
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Alternatively, the parties can contract a 500% royalty rate on the cost of the 
chipset.  A change in the royalty base can be commuted with an inversely 
proportional change in the royalty rate: 5% of $1000 = 500% of $10 = $50.  
If the royalty base is divided by 100, then the royalty rate can be multiplied 
by 100 and the total revenue made by the SEP owner will remain constant.   
In algebraic terms, $1=$1. As long as parties can adjust the royalty rate, 
changes to the royalty base are neutral.33   
This result is an application of the royalty allocation neutrality result of 
Layne-Farrar et al.34  They show that licensing at the upstream (component) 
or at the downstream (handset) level is irrelevant for welfare and that only 
the sum of the royalty charged matters.  This neutrality result is constructed 
assuming efficient bargaining and per-unit royalties both at the upstream 
and the downstream levels.  
In the following sections, we show that introducing behavioral bias in 
royalty negotiation does not alter the neutrality of the royalty revenue 
multiplication. 
 
B.  Behavioral Economics and Anchoring Effects 
 
Behavioral economics study the impact of cognitive, psychological and 
emotional factors on individuals’ decision-making processes.  The findings 
of behavioral economics challenge mainstream rational choice theory.  
Behavioral economics shows that economic agents’ decisions are based on 
heuristics.35 As a result, their behavior often deviate from that of perfectly 
rational agents.  Behavioral economics research in turn documents the 
determinants of behavioral biases.   
Against this backdrop, behavioral economics show that when the value 
of a good or service is difficult to assess, economic agents tend to construct 
valuation preferences in regard of certain starting points, framing contexts 
and value signals.  In this regard, a particularly strong heuristic, identified 
by Tversky and Kahneman, is known as the anchoring effect.36 The idea is 
                                                
33 The choice of royalty base is not neutral when it changes the way firms are 
competing on the downstream market.  See Kamien and Tauman, supra note 5 and San 
Martin and Samacho, Llobet and Padilla supra note 6 for models where the choice a royalty 
basis impact competition on the market.  
34 Anne Layne-Farrar, Gerard Llobet and J. Padilla, Patent Licensing in Vertically 
Disaggregated Industries: The Royalty Allocation Neutrality Principle, 95 DIGIWORLD 
ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 61-84 (2014).   
35 This term denotes intuitive, rapid, automatic and often simple rules of thumb.   
Adrian Furnham,, and Hua Chu Boo, A Literature Review of the Anchoring Effect, 40 
THE JOURNAL OF SOCIO-ECONOMICS, 35-42 (2011). 
36 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCIENCE, 1124-1131 (1974). 
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that economic agents make estimates by starting from an initial value which 
they then adjust to yield the final answer.  Behavioral economics in turn 
show that adjustments are systematically insufficient, because they are 
biased towards the initial value that is presented to them.37   Hence the term 
anchoring.  In the seminal experiment of Tversky and Kanheman, 
participants spun a wheel of fortune and received a percentage number, 10 
% or 65%.  They were then asked to estimate the percentage of African 
countries that participated in the United Nations.  Those presented with a 
low starting value (10%) reported a median 25% and those with a higher 
stating value (65%) reported a median 45%.   
The anchoring effect suggests that the estimated value of a SEP 
protected technology may be assessed differently if the initial reference for 
the royalty base is a $1,000 handset or a $10 chipset.   Exposed to a $1,000 
end product, the estimated value is likely to be high; exposed to a $10 
component it is likely to be low.  And the anchoring effect is likely to be 
more pronounced when there are huge differences between the two royalty 
bases.  Put differently, the use of a low price anchor in the factor royalty 
base is likely to depress the product of the multiplication while a high price 
anchor in the factor royalty base is likely to boost the product of the 
multiplication.   In our example, if the handset is the anchor, the technology 
valuation will be $50.  But if the parties start to discuss with the chipset in 
mind, they may consider a lower valuation, for instance $40, 30, 20, 10, 5 
or even 1. A change in the royalty base therefore affects the valuation of the 
technology by both parties in a royalty negotiation between a SEP owner 
and a prospective licensee.  
  
C.  Anchoring Effects: Application to SEP 
Bargaining 
 
Let us now look at the consequences of anchoring effects on licensing 
discussions between SEP owners and implementers.  A useful and realistic 
way to represent a hypothetical negotiation has been proposed by Sidak, 
who offers to frame it as a negotiation within a well-specified bargaining 
range.38 Because parties to a negotiation have distinct valuations in mind, 
the bargaining range represents the zone of acceptable technology 
                                                
37 Ariely et al. show that consumers’ evaluation of goods is arbitrary even for 
experience goods in a set-up with full information.  However, once the initial estimate has 
been made, subsequent variations are coherent, consistent for instance with the law of 
demand.  They refer to the concept of coherent-arbitrariness to represent this behavior.   
 Dan Ariely, George Lowenstein and Drazen Prelec, Coherent Arbirariness: Stable 
Demand Curves without Stable Preferences, 118 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMICS, 73-104 (2003). 
38 Sidak supra note 4.   
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valuations within which a mutually profitable licensing agreement between 
the SEP owner and the implementer can be reached.  The upper bound of 
the bargaining range represents the maximum valuation at which the 
implementer is willing to buy (WTB).  The WTB is a function of the costs 
incurred to manufacture a compliant product, and of the opportunity costs 
of redesigning a non-infringing product.  The lower bound represents the 
lowest valuation at which the SEP owner is willing to sell (WTS) the 
technology. The WTS is essentially a function of the sunk costs incurred to 
develop the technology, and of the opportunity costs of non-transacting. 
If the bargaining range is non-empty i.e. if the buyer’s WTB is higher 
than the seller’s WTS, there is a variety of mutually profitable agreements.  
The exact valuation point at which the parties settle is a function of the 
parties’ bargaining power.   
In practice, valuations are exchanged in royalty terms.  When the parties 
agree on a given royalty level, the buyer’s surplus is the difference between 
its WTB and the royalty level and the seller’s surplus is the difference 
between the royalty level and its WTS.    The total surplus (or welfare) is 
the sum of the buyer’s and the seller’s surplus that is the difference between 
the WTB and the WTS.  Figure 1 illustrates the bargaining range over 
which the parties negotiate a licensing agreement, the licensing point and 
the surpluses assuming that the bargaining range is non-empty. 
 
 
Figure 1: The bargaining range  
Returning to our example, consider that the parties negotiate a licensing 
agreement taking the EMV as the base.  Suppose that the SEP implementer 
WTB is $60 and that the SEP owner WTS is $40.    
Consider now the same hypothesis, with the tweak that the SSPPU is the 
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base.  This change in initial conditions produces lower valuations for the 
technology on both bounds. Anchoring effects reduce the implementer 
WTB to $40 and the SEP owner WTS to $20.  An important finding of the 
behavioral economics literature is indeed that anchoring affects both buying 
and selling decisions, in our example in a symmetric way.39  This leads to a 
downward shift of the bargaining range.   Figure 2 illustrates this change.  
Such a shift in valuations has an impact on the negotiated royalty level 
(assuming there is no change in the bargaining power of the parties in the 
negotiation).  If the negotiated royalty level is for instance the median point 
between the upper and lower bounds – as would be the case in a Nash 
bargaining with equal bargaining power – then SSPPU will inevitably shift 
down the royalty point to reflect the lower technology valuations, in our 
example from $50 to $30. 
 
Figure 2: Impact of apportionment method on bargaining range 
 
However, the change in the royalty level illustrated on Figures 2 is 
unproblematic from a welfare standpoint.  As can be seen, the bargaining 
range shifts downward but the total surplus remains the same under EMV 
and SSPPU.  This means that there is an equal amount of economic surplus 
($20) to share between the parties in both settings, though the technology is 
nominally valued at lower levels in SSPPU.  As long as either 
apportionment method generates an equal amount of surplus, there is no 
                                                
39 Itamar Simonson and Aimee Drolet, Anchoring Effects on Consumers' Willingness-
to-pay and Willingness-to-accept, 31 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, 681-690 (2004). 
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reason to favor one over the other from an economic standpoint. Hence, 
anchoring effects are not in themselves a concern and from a distributional 
point of view, the change of royalty base is neutral.  Moreover, in efficiency 
terms, there is no room for worry as long as the rule was in place at the time 
of entry in the industry by both parties.  Pricing effects will have been 
anticipated and internalized by industry participants, when they made the 
decision to invest.40   
Moreover, the anchoring literature provides additional insights on the 
likely impact of anchors on royalty negotiations.  First, the behavioral 
economy literature recognizes that “greater cognitive skills decrease 
anchoring effects”.41 Second, several studies have suggested that anchoring 
effects can be –at least partially – corrected in business negotiations, for 
instance when parties concentrate on eliciting the other’s reservation 
prices.42 These observations could mitigate the importance of the anchoring 
effect in multiple digit licensing contract negotiations between expert SEP 
owners and implementers.     
That said, even if SEP negotiators may not be trapped by low initial 
values and may overcome the behavioral bias created by the selection of 
SSPPU as the licensing basis, there is another reason why SSPPU exerts 
anchoring effects on expert negotiations between SEP owners and 
implementers.  Licensing negotiations take place in the shadow of litigation.  
If the discussions break down, the best alternative to a negotiated agreement 
consists in having an impartial spectator – a judge, arbitrator or agency – 
setting the estimated value of the technology.   Thus, even if parties can 
escape behavioral traps, anchoring effects will influence the computation of 
damages in courts if judges apply SSPPU as the basis for fixing royalties.  
  
IV. SSPPU+, HIDDEN REVENUE CAP AND ECONOMIC SURPLUS 
REDISTRIBUTION 
  
In an industry subject to SSPPU, there is a lower valuation for the 
technology which can be observed in the smaller nominal valuations of the 
upper and lower bounds of the bargaining range.  Yet, this is neutral in 
                                                
40 As long as this valuation system was anticipated and applicable prior to investments 
in technology and costs being incurred by market players.  This is an important 
qualification.  Our finding may not hold if SSPPU is transitionally introduced in a market, 
when economic agents have based their investments and costs decisions on a distinct 
valuation system.  
41 Oscar Bergman, Tore Ellingsen, Magnus Johannesson and Cicek Svensson, 
Anchoring and Cognitive Ability, 107 ECONOMICS LETTERS, 66-68. 
42 Adam Galinsky and Thomas Mussweiler, First Offers as Anchors: the Role of 
Perspective Taking and Negotiator Focus. 81 JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY, 657–669 (2001). 
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terms of economic surplus.  As seen above in our examples, the zone 
covered by the bargaining range is the same, and the total surplus shared 
between the parties remains equal.  However, when component licensing is 
applied on top of SSPPU – namely SSPPU+ – there is an additional effect 
on the distribution of the surplus between parties.  Due to other negotiation 
constraints (A), SSPPU+ collapses the upper bound of the bargaining range 
and thus creates a hidden revenue cap (B). Given this cap, patented 
technologies will be sold at a uniform price across industries, failing to 
internalize complementarities (C).  
 
A.  Negotiation Constraints  
 
When SSPPU+ is the rule, the bargaining range is not as large as under end-
user device licensing or as under SSPPU with end-user device licensing.  
Indeed, when component licensing and SSPPU operate in conjunction, the 
upper bound of the bargaining range is lower.  This is due to yet another set 
of behavioral and legal constraints. 
   
1. Behavioral Constraints 
 
So-called “unit effects”, a variant of the above mentioned anchoring effect, 
limit the ability to adjust the royalty level in percentage terms.  The concept 
of unit effects originates in behavioral economics.  It explains that 
economic agents focus more on the number than on the unit.  Unit effects 
predict that a 500% royalty rate will be perceived as “high” while a 5% 
royalty rate will be perceived as “small”.  Due to unit effects, variations of 
several percentage points from industry practice may be tolerated.  But 
larger changes to the royalty rate factor will not be possible.  
Let us apply this to our hypothetical example.  In both the EMV and 
SSPPU scenarios where WTB and WTS are respectively $60-$40 to $40-
$20,43 the application of SSPPU+ (that is component licensing) to a $10 
chipset produces a royalty rate specification of 500% and 300% 
respectively, whereas end-user licensing produces a royalty rate 
specification of 5% and 3% respectively. 
In practice, unit effects limit the possibility to impose high nominal 
royalty rate.  This rigidity is likely to be particularly compounded in sectors 
where components sell for a low price.44  But, if a change in the royalty 
                                                
43 Unit effects are not specific to SSPPU and can also exist with EMV, as long as 
component licensing is applicable. 
44 It is often said that there is a 25% rate that governs intellectual property transactions. 
This rule sets that royalties represent one fourth of the profits made by the product that 
embodies the patented technology.  Robert Goldscheider, John Jarosz and Carla Mulhern, 
Use Of The 25 Per Cent Rule In Valuing IP, LES NOUVELLES, 123-133 (2002); Richard  
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basis cannot be accompanied by an inversely proportional change in the 
royalty rate, the multiplication is no longer neutral.  
As far as real case applications are concerned, unit effects have been 
encountered in Cornell v HP.  Here the jury agreed on a royalty rate of 
0.8%.  The judge then proceeded to determine the SSPPU.  Interestingly, 
the judge changed the SSPPU from the CPU brick to the processor, yet kept 
the royalty rate constant at 0.8%, leading to a change in royalty revenue 
from $23 billion to $6.6 billion. This example, described in greater details 
by Putnam and Williams45, illustrates the fact that the royalty basis and the 
royalty rate are not determined simultaneously, a condition for the neutrality 
of multiplication.  Rather the court decided first on the royalty rate and later 
adjusted the royalty basis to the smallest component’s turnover without 
modifying the royalty rate.  
 
2. Antitrust Constraints 
 
Antitrust legislation may prevent the formulation of high nominal royalty 
levels when component licensing is applied, all the more so when the 
royalty level is specified as a percentage rate.  This influence operates 
through various legal doctrines that we discuss hereafter.   
First, in all antitrust jurisdictions where a system of control of excessive 
prices exists, like the EU, China and Korea and many others, high nominal 
royalty rates are not in the cards.  For the purposes of this subsection, let us 
focus on EU antitrust law given its significant experience in the field (as 
compared, for example, to younger Asian antitrust regimes).  EU antitrust 
rules prohibit dominant firms from imposing “unfair purchase or selling 
prices or other unfair trading conditions”.  The law does not define at what 
level a price can be deemed unfair.  In United Brands, the EU courts 
referred to a price that “has no reasonable relation to the economic value of 
the product supplied”.46  In practice, agencies and courts have consistently 
deemed unfair prices which exceed costs by more than 100% the value of 
the product/service in question.47  In more recent cases, the Court said that 
                                                                                                                       
Razgaitis, Pricing the Intellectual Property of Early-Stage Technologies: A Primer of Basic 
Valuation Tools and Considerations, in Anatole Krattiger et al, Intellectual Property 
Management in Health and Agricultural Innovation: A Handbook of Best Practices, 
Volumes 1 and 2, 813-860 (2007). See also, KPMG International, Profitability and Royalty 
rates across Industries: Some Preliminary Evidence (2012). available at  
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2015/09/gvi-profitability.pdf.  
45 Putnam and Williams, supra note 3.  
46 See Judgment of the Court of 14 February 1978 in United Brands v Commission, 
27/76, EU:C:1978:22, §250. 
47 See Erik Pijnacker Hordijk, Excessive Pricing under EC Competition Law: An 
Update in the Light of ‘Dutch Developments’, in Barry E. Hawk (ed.) 2001 Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute, 463-496 (2002).   For instance, in ITT/Promedia, the EU antitrust 
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an unreasonable price was one that is “prohibitive”.48  In the area of cartel 
law, antitrust authorities even go as far as to consider that a 25% overcharge 
on markets denotes a threshold value for the harm caused by shared 
monopoly power. 
Second, rigidities may also bear on the royalty rate factor through the 
application of antitrust essential facilities rules or contractual duty to deals. 
Essential facilities doctrines exist in the EU, China, Korea and many other 
jurisdictions.  In the US, a similar effect is achieved through contract law, 
when FRAND terms are interpreted as requiring patent owners to their SEPs 
to modem chip suppliers.  In FTC v Qualcomm, Judge Lucy Koh held that the 
TIA and ATIS IPR policies both required Qualcomm to license its SEPs to 
modem chip suppliers, including to competitors.49 The concrete implication of 
such duties is to trigger the application of intrusive conduct remedies on 
firms, in the form of duties to supply in general, and of duties to license in 
the particular case of IP owners.  Almost invariably, antitrust jurisdictions 
which impose on dominant firms a duty to license also force them to 
transact on reasonable terms.  If we conjecture that a dominant SEP owner 
may be subject to an antitrust duty to license its technology, then we must 
accept that antitrust agencies will scrutinize that the royalty basis50 and the 
royalty rates charged for the technology are not set at a level that de facto 
prevents the conclusion of a licensing agreement.  This is what happened in 
the Microsoft case. Having imposed a duty to license interoperability 
information on Microsoft, complex discussions were engaged to find 
agreement on “reasonable and non-discriminatory terms”.  The case ended 
in Court, and a large fine was inflicted on Microsoft for failure to offer 
FRAND rates. 
                                                                                                                       
agency was concerned that the price charged by the Belgian incumbent telephony operator 
to publisher of telephone directories were almost 100% above the costs it incurred for the 
collection, treatment and provision of data to the directories publishers.  Under such 
prohibitions, any royalty rate that represent one or more times the value of the component 
could be deemed unlawful. And in British Leyland, the ECJ undertook a comparison 
between the historical prices of the dominant firm and the prices it charged in the past. The 
Court found that the fees had increased 600% during the relevant period, and considered as 
a result that they were abusive.  
48 Judgment of the General Court of 27 June 2012 in Microsoft v Commission, T-
167/08, EU:T:2012:323, §142. 
49 FTC v Qualcomm, Order Granting FTC’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 06 
November 2018, Case No. 17-CV-00220-LHK. 
50 “Viewed through the lens of the entire market value rule, a refusal to license at the 
chip and component level, as part of an overall strategy of price discrimination, is merely a 
disguised attempt by the patentee to obtain a patent royalty in excess of what the patent, 
considered by itself, is worth. Thus, the entire market value rule, and the principle of the 
smallest saleable unit, will tend to undermine the legitimacy of any strategy of refusing to 
license at the chip and component level”. 
Karl D. Belgum, The Next Battle Over FRAND: The Definition of FRAND Terms and 
Multi-Level Licensing, 39 JOURNAL OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2014). 
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Third, in the specific area of FRAND-pledged SEPs, various 
jurisdictions now refer to industry practice as the reference for assessing 
whether a proposed FRAND rate is antitrust compliant.  In Huaweï v ZTE, 
the Court of Justice of the EU said that FRAND discussions ought to 
comply with “recognized commercial practices in the field”.51  The effect of 
such case-law doctrines is to transform informal industry practice into 
legally enforceable principles.  The US approach to FRAND puts emphasis 
on royalty rate levels, and the evidentiary rules suggest to use comparable 
licenses in order to determine the FRAND royalty rate.52  But comparable 
licenses may not be a good indicator of the patented feature’s value.    In the 
case of patent negotiation, a foreseeable application is the 25% industry 
norm.  Under this rule (of thumb), an IP owner can legitimately receive a 
royalty rate equivalent to 25 per cent of the expected revenue for the 
application that practices the IP at issue. When significant, deviations from 
the 25% may be conducive to antitrust liability.  
Fourth, a convoluted way to prevent SEP owners to extract royalties 
from the end-product involves the application of the antitrust rules together 
with the doctrine of “patent exhaustion”.  This could apply in the specific 
scenario where a SEP owner conditions the granting of license to a chip 
maker to an obligation to sell only to device makers who have themselves 
taken a license.  This practice, known as “multi-level” licensing, entitles 
SEP owners to price discriminate, by charging distinct royalties at different 
levels in the value chain. An SSPPU+ committed antitrust agency could 
come to the realization that multi-level licensing undermines the whole 
point of seeking to reduce the royalty burden in SEP-intense industries.  
Such agencies may thus attempt to prevent multi-level licensing, by 
considering that contractual terms conditioning the granting of a license to 
resale restrictions are either abusive in themselves or form part of an 
anticompetitive agreement amenable to antitrust liability, because they 
negate the “exhaustion” principle whereby “one who purchases from a 
patentee or licensee in an authorized sale obtains the patented product free 
and clear of patent rights”.53  
Note that none of the above antitrust doctrines has yet been specifically 
tested against SEP owners, and that their positive validity remains 
uncertain.  This notwithstanding, the flexibility of antitrust laws is such that 
there is a non-trivial chance that an agency could attempt to experiment one 
                                                
51 Judgment of the Court of 16 July 2015 in Huawei Technologies  v ZTE, C-170/13, 
EU:C:2015:477, §65. 
52 Justus Baron, Chryssoula Pentheroudakis and Nikolaus Thumm, FRAND Licensing 
in Theory and in Practice: Proposal for a Common Framework, CPI ANTITRUST 
CHRONICLE, 1-8 (2016).  
53 Belgun, supra note 50.   
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or all of such novel interpretations, anticipating to be backed by review 
courts when its decision will be challenged.  
 
B.  Hidden Revenue Cap and Economic Surplus 
Redistribution 
 
The previous section shows that behavioral biases and antitrust rules 
prevent the specification of any royalty level in licensing negotiations.  
There is therefore a de facto price-cap on the royalty rate.  What is more 
interesting, however, is that the joint operation of this rate-cap and of 
component licensing under SSPPU+ implies that there is also a hidden 
revenue cap on the total royalty payment for the SEP owner.    
Let us denote by rmax, the highest admissible nominal royalty rate, by Ck 
the cost (or value) of the SEP-protected component k which is used as the 
royalty base (as proposed under SSPPU+).  The total revenue for the SEP 
owner is at most:  
 
Rmax = rmax x Ck  (2) 
 
The hidden revenue cap means that the SEP owner cannot expect to 
receive more than Rmax, should negotiation break down, and the licensing 
rate be fixed by a court, arbitration tribunal or antitrust agency. The hidden 
revenue cap shrinks the zone covered by the bargaining range in royalty 
negotiations.  The story depicted in Figure 2 is therefore incomplete.  If 
Rmax<WTB, the upper bound of the bargaining range is fixed by the hidden 
revenue cap.  Indeed, a prospective licensee will never agree to pay a higher 
price than the default price, set by a court, arbitration tribunal or antitrust 
agency.   Figure 3 depicts the bargaining range under the SSPPU+ with the 
upper bound corresponding to Rmax, considering that the bargaining range is 
non-empty.  As it is shown on the Figure, with a hidden revenue cap, the 
surplus and the bargaining range do no longer coincide.  The surplus is the 
difference between the WTB and the WTS, the bargaining range the 
difference between Rmax and WTS.  This means that the parties no longer 
bargain to share the entire surplus.  The imposition of such a revenue cap 
has therefore important redistributive effects. 
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Figure 3: Impact of a hidden revenue cap on the bargaining range 
 
1. Redistribution to Implementers 
 
The first redistributive effect consists in a transfer of surplus to SEP 
implementers.  As can be seen on figure 3, the bargaining range is a subset 
of the economic surplus. Due to the abovementioned negotiation 
constraints, royalty terms in the higher region of the surplus are unavailable. 
Put differently, the addition of component licensing in SSPPU+ acts as a 
haircut on the bargaining range.   
The consequences of this haircut on the bargaining process are easy to 
infer.  The parties will negotiate a royalty term within the bargaining range.  
A downward shift in the upper bound of the bargaining range will decrease 
the royalty term point.  But the story is different from Figure 2 because in 
this case, the distribution of the surplus between the SEP owner and the 
implementer will be different.  Assuming total surplus and bargaining 
power is unchanged, the buyer’s share of surplus will increase at the 
expense of the seller’s share.  The buyer will receive a larger share of 
surplus since the upper bound of the bargaining range is below its WTB.  
The parties will negotiate a royalty term within the bargaining range but 
part of the surplus is already in the pocket of the licensee should an 
agreement be reached.    In other words, when negotiation takes place under 
SSPPU+, what is to be shared is not the total surplus (WTB-WTS) but the 
bargaining range (Rmax-WTS).  Unless the SEP owner enjoys greater 
bargaining power, the distribution of surplus under SSPPU+ is biased 
towards implementers.    
According to the revenue cap formula in Equation (2), the highest 
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possible revenue is a function of the nominal royalty term, which is capped, 
and the royalty basis i.e. the smallest component cost in the SSPPU.  This 
has one important consequence.  A technology that is embodied in a chipset 
that costs just a few dollars to manufacture will generate a low unit revenue 
for its owner.   Of course, one may counterclaim that the cost of the chipset 
should not be confused with its value.  But the practice of licensing 
negotiations may lead to use the chipset cost as a proxy, because it will 
often be the only available metric to discuss the value added to the 
component.54  Moreover, antitrust law often dictates to look at cost as a 
proxy for economic value.  In United Brands, the EU courts said that the 
economic value of a product could be assessed by looking at its cost of 
production.55  As a result of this, the upper bound of the bargaining range 
will often be cost-based and not linked to the added-value of the SEP 
protect technology.  As the cost and the value are two different things, 
connecting the revenue to the cost potentially creates a huge gap between 
the SEP owner’s revenue and the technology value.     
 
2. Redistribution amongst SEP owners 
 
The biased distribution of surplus may also occur amongst SEP owners, due 
to the specific nature of the standardization process itself.  SSOs combine 
technologies, owned by multiple firms, to address a given technical 
problem.   In economic terms, the technologies that support a standard are 
complements. They have no or lower value when implemented on a 
standalone basis but yield high or higher value when combined with other 
technologies. Against this backdrop, SSPPU+ rule does not only redistribute 
value from SEP owners to implementers but also amongst SEP owners.  
This can again be understood with a stylized example.  Consider two 
complementary technologies A and B that are selected to form a standard 
AB.  The standard generates a $20 surplus.  Suppose that this surplus is 
shared under EMV licensing as followed: a $10 surplus for the component 
implementer and a $10 surplus for the SEP owners, each getting a $5 
surplus.  And assume that component makers who implement the 
technology costs are respectively CA=$1 and CB=$2.  When the royalty 
basis is the component cost, SEP owner A must apply a 500% royalty rate 
and SEP owner B a 250% royalty rate to collect the same surplus.  Clearly 
the same revenue sharing cannot be implemented with SSPPU+ and SEP 
                                                
54 As Kappos and Michell, supra note 24: “It is even argued that in an infringement 
case against a multi-component product, the SSPPU concept implies that the royalty base 
must be derived not from the value the invention contributes to the end product, but from 
the cost to the infringer of one or more components it purchased from its suppliers”.   
55 United Brands, supra note 46. 
22 SSPPU AND COMPONENT LICENSING (Nov. 2018) 
owners will collect lower royalties.  Consequently, the implementer collects 
a larger share of the surplus.  
  Now suppose that CA=$1 but CB=$7.   In this case, by applying a 
100% royalty rate, SEP owners A and B will collect a surplus of 
respectively $1 and $7 while the implementer has a surplus of $13.   In such 
setting, there is not only a transfer of surplus from SEP owners to 
implementers, but there is also a redistribution from SEP owners that 
address low cost implementations to SEP owners that sell high costs 
components or inefficient ones.  Whilst the revenue cap is strong for SEPs 
with low cost implementations, it is much less constraining for SEPs with 
high costs implementations, because the later enjoy a larger royalty base on 
which to collect more value in the negotiation process.   Likewise, SSPPU+ 
is likely to favor vertically integrated component manufacturers.56 
  
3. Impossibility of Trade 
 
At a certain order of magnitude, SSPPU+ shrinks the bargaining range to 
the point where it becomes empty (Figure 4).  Consider a situation where 
the upper bound of the bargaining range Rmax falls below the seller’s WTS.  
Then, there is no royalty term within the bargaining range that can return a 
positive surplus to the seller.  This situation occurs despite the fact that 
there would be a positive surplus from trade.  In that circumstance, we face 
the impossibility for parties of agreeing on a mutually profitable trade.57 
 
 
Figure 4: Impossibility of trade 
                                                
56 Putnam and William, supra note 3.     
57 Sidak supra note 4 says that there is no voluntary agreement in reach.  
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Let us revert to our initial example.  Assume that SSPPU+ lays down an 
implicit cap a 100% cap on the royalty rate. If the component cost is $10, 
the highest revenue for the seller is 100% x $10 = $10.  This value 
represents the upper bound of the bargaining range. Yet, the bargaining 
range under SSPPU+ is empty because the seller’s WTS is equal to $30.   
The zone of possible agreement between the SEP owner and the 
implementer decreases. Therefore, a higher likelihood of early litigation 
exists under SSPPU+ than under SSPPU or EMV.  To be more concrete, 
under SSPPU+, there is a non trivial possibility that the SEP owner initial 
FRAND offer and the SEP implementer initial counter-offer will be worlds 
apart.  As a result, parties will more promptly bring their different before 
courts.  Interestingly, the paradox that ensues is while SSPPU+ was 
supposed to solve perceived problems, courts will be increasingly faced 
with extreme demands on both sides.  This, in turn, will create a reinforcing 
feedback loop that there is a market failure that needs to be solved. 
 
 
C.  Complementary technologies and Uniform Pricing 
 
Often technologies spread among multiple application sectors, creating 
value and complementarities across industries. Technologies like Wi-Fi or 
5G display important vertical and horizontal externalities.  With the Internet 
of Things, a whole set of objects (physical objects, home appliances, 
vehicles) will be equipped with communications chips and sensor.   
However, the value of a technology will be different from one sector to 
another.  The same communication technology will be used for automated 
vehicles and for monitoring the content of a fridge or the room temperature.  
Clearly enough, the benefits of a communicating fridge are far below those 
of an automated car.   
If we follow the proposition that technology prices should reflect 
externalities, then this implies that royalty revenue for GPT should vary 
across application sectors, product uses and implementing processes.  In 
other words, if a technology is used in two applications sectors, the price 
should vary to reflect the different externalities created in the two sectors.   
With this background, suppose that a standard A embodied in a component 
with cost CA = $5.   Standard A can be combined used in two sectors: sector 
B where it has a value of $20 and sector C where its value is equal to $3. 
Quite logically, royalty negotiations should lead to a lower payment for the 
technology in sector C where it has less value than in sector B.  Indeed, 
implementers in sectors B and C will not pay more than the technology 
added value and in that sense, the values of $20 and $3 represent the 
willingness to buy of sectors B and C.  However, we have argued that the 
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SSPPU+ imposes a revenue cap on royalty revenue and that this revenue 
cap is cost-oriented i.e. linked to the component value CA=$5.   Therefore in 
both sectors, the bargaining range will have the same upper bound 
corresponding to the hidden revenue cap Rmax.    In such a situation, without 
substantial differences in the bargaining power of the parties between the 
two sectors, it is likely that the SSPPU+ leads to uniform pricing of the 
technology.   Uniform pricing means that the extra benefit of the 
standardized technology will not be collected by the developers but by the 
implementers in sectors B and C.   In other words, by imposing the same 
basis for computing royalties in sectors B and C, and by limiting the 
nominal royalty rate, the SSPPU+ fails to take into account the externalities 
and complementarities created by a technology, at the benefit of the 
implementers and at the expense of the technology developers.  
 
V. GENERAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGIES  
 
To close, this paper formulates the intuition that the indiscriminate 
application of SSPPU+ to all standards including those with sizeable 
externalities may disconnect the royalty revenue from the added-value 
brought by the technology.  In particular, there are specific concerns related 
to general purpose technologies (GPT) that need to be taken into account.   
This is the issue that we now explore.  
GPTs are technologies that yield substantial externalities across multiple 
applications sectors.58  Textbook examples include the steam engine, 
electrification and the Internet.  GPTs are primarily studied in 
macroeconomics, and in particular in the field of growth theory.59  
GPTs have three main attributes: first, they enjoy “general 
applicability” in the sense that they “perform a generic function that is vital 
to the functioning of a large number of using products” and processes. 
Second, they display “technological dynamism”, that is it that the efficiency 
of the generic technology improves continuously, which drives further 
adoption in novel applications sectors. Third, GPTs benefit from 
“innovational complementarities” with using products, in the sense that 
improvements in the GPT makes it more profitable for applications 
developers to innovate, which in turn increases demand for, and 
investments in, the GPT itself.60    
                                                
58 Timothy Bresnahan and Manuel Trajtenberg, General Purpose Technologies: 
Engines of Growth, 65 JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 83-108 (1995). 
59 Nicholas Crafts, Steam as a General Purpose Technology: A Growth Accounting 
Perspective, 114 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 338-351 (2004). 
60 See Nathan Rosenberg and Manuel Trajtenberg, A General-Purpose Technology at 
Work: The Corliss Steam Engine in the Late-Nineteenth-Century United States, 64 THE 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY, 61-99 (2004).  Others decompose those features in four 
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There is no consensus on the precise definition of a GPT but most 
papers frame the benefits of GPTs in terms of externalities, both vertical 
(between the GPT and an application sector) and horizontal (across 
applications sectors).61  In the literature, externalities also do not diffuse 
instantly, and are instead subject to significant time gaps and sequentiality.  
The literature distinguishes two phases of growth for GPT.62  There is a 
first growth phase in which the technology diffuses.  Growth is then driven 
by the adoption of the technology.  Growth in the second phase is driven by 
investments in complementary technologies and the diffusion of the 
technology in all sectors of the economy.  We show this in figure 5, which 
distinguishes both phases.   
 
Figure 5: GPT Timing and Optimal Appropriability Policy 
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This feature gives rise to “imperfect appropriability”. In turn, the 
literature considers that policy, governance and institutional measures can 
increase the appropriability of investments in GPTs, and promote 
innovation. Yet, policy measures may also run counter to the diffusion of 
GPTs, in particular if they lower the returns to complementary investments 
made by users.63  Which of both effects dominates the other is, however, 
unclear.  Bresnahan and Trajtenberg note that “pricing rules [will imply] 
that neither side will have sufficient incentives to innovate”.64  But several 
studies call our attention to the “time horizon”.65  As explained before, the 
conventional GPT model describes a cycle with a first phase of lower 
output, and a second phase of growth.  A growth-oriented policy that stands 
at the beginning of the first phase, may want to minimize its length.  In turn, 
this suggests policy measures aiming at fostering competition in the 
components sector.  By contrast, at the beginning of a second phase, an 
acceleration of growth should lead to the adoption of measures “increasing 
appropriability”.66  Helpman and Trajtenberg briefly mention, but without 
more details, antitrust and intellectual property.  Yet, this brings some 
perspective to the specific SEP context, where some authors have argued 
that the SSPPU implies that the SEP owner should not benefit from 
standardization via a price effect but only via a volume effect.67 
 In our view, a number of limiting principles emerge from the 
combination of the abovementioned general scholarship on GPTs and our 
specific research on SSPPU+.   First, recall that there is considerable 
uncertainty in the ability to identify GPTs both prospectively and 
retrospectively.  From a policy standpoint, this risk of error in 
misdiagnosing a GPT should impart caution in the calibration of 
appropriability or competition-spirited remedies at early stages of 
technology development.  This is why measures like SSPPU+ (or the EMV) 
that indiscriminately apply to all licensing discussions ex ante should be 
avoided, and only be envisioned as one possible option in ex post patent 
damages litigation, where the general purpose character of a technology can 
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be better verified.   
Second, if policy makers are confident in their GPT diagnosis, then the 
calibration of appropriability versus competition-spirited remedies should 
be a function of the maturity of the technology under consideration.  In 
other words, competition-spirited remedies (like antitrust initiatives) should 
be deployed at early stages of GPT introduction, and appropriability-driven 
measures (like strong intellectual property protection) should be promoted 
when complementary applications, components and inputs have been 
developed.    
If we try apply this to standards, and in particular to wireless 
communications standards where SSPPU+ is in discussion, we can instantly 
notice practical difficulties.  Whilst it may be tempting to view each 
generation of standards (2G, 3G, 4G and 5G) as a distinct GPT, it is equally 
possible to consider the initial wireless technology as the GPT.  Depending 
on the perspective, then the exact location of the policy maker on the time 
horizon changes (horizontal axis).  In the former hypothesis – each 
generation of wireless communications standards – is a GPT, then 
competition-spirited remedies (like SSPPU+) are appropriate.  In the later 
hypothesis – early wireless communications standards were the GPT – then 
appropriability-friendly measures seem warranted.   This question, which is 
largely empirical, is however rendered even more complicated due to the 
introduction of evolutionary versions of wireless standards, like EDGE 
(2,5G) or LTE (3,5G).   
Purely anecdotal reasons, however, raise doubts that each wireless 
standard could be characterized as a stand-alone GPT.  No economic paper 
seems to consider incremental improvements in the performance of the 
steam engine, electrification and Internet connectivity as GPTs of their own.  
Instead, such improvements are often used as proof of concept, to 
characterize the base, generic technology as the GPT.  We see no obvious 




This paper has explored the effects of a widespread generalization of 
SSPPU+ pricing from both a distributional and efficiency perspectives.  It 
shows how a pricing rule that only changes the royalty base without 
controlling for the royalty rate nevertheless imposes a hidden revenue cap 
on standardized technologies, and distorts the distribution of revenue in 
ways adverse to technology developers.  And, as we have said, 
redistribution is not only a matter of rent sharing.   Redistribution may alter 
the incentives to participate in the standardization process and promote 
alternative business models like proprietary standards, vertical integration.  
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We discuss some possible consequences to conclude our paper.    
First, it cannot be excluded that licensing firms may switch to 
alternative valuation models, like fixed fee licensing.  Following Kamien 
and Tauman68, the literature shows that the valuation method impacts both 
firms on the downstream market by modifying the dynamics of competition 
as well as firms on the upstream market by changing their incentives to 
innovate.   The optimal valuation method depends on the nature of 
competition (price v quantity), the type of innovation (drastic v minor) and 
the participation of the innovator in the downstream market.69   
Second, SSPPU+ could have an even more drastic impact on firms’ 
strategic decisions.  In a classic Coasian trade-off between markets and 
hierarchies, firms exposed to coslty transactions with third parties may 
substitute vertical integration to licensing negotiation.  In particular, SEP 
developers may resort to forward (downstream) integration in the 
component segment, to keep their ability to license at the end-user level.  
Several contemporary high level merger transactions  could possibly be 
explained on that ground (Qualcomm attempt to acquire NXP and Intel 
acquisition of Mobileye).  Interestingly, this conjecture is supported by the 
fact that most reported transactions to date do not purport to achieve vertical 
integration in the end-user smartphone market, but instead target the 
intermediary component market. 
Third, the narrower spread of the bargaining range denotes a 
reduction in the size of negotiable rewards for SEP owners.  With this, 
expected profits from technology licensing decrease.  Adverse incentives 
effects can no longer be excluded. In the first place, firms incentives to 
participate to SSOs may decrease.  This could manifest itself through a 
variety of ways.  One is that SEP owners may be increasingly reluctant to 
offer FRAND pledges before SSOs which apply SSPPU and/or SSPPU+.  
In this respect, a statistically significant decline of about 85% in the 
FRAND letter of assurances (LoAs) submitted has been documented before 
IEEE since the change of its patent policy.70  Another one is that SEP 
owners may find novel ways to eschew SSPPU+ type obligations through 
convoluted means.  For example, it has been reported that Nokia and 
Interdigital have submitted three negative LoAs.  Those letters are different 
from traditional FRAND pledges, because they expressly indicate 
unwillingness to license under the new IEEE policy.  Instead, negative 
LoAs commit to license under the previous IEEE policy. And a last 
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possibility, is that SEP owners may relocate their membership decisions 
towards non-SSPU SSOs. Or to put the point differently, technology 
developers may abandon trade-association or profession oriented “grey 
standards” forums like IEEE or IETF which are typically driven by 
implementers, and favor “formal standardization” organizations where they 
entertain more influence.71  Technical competition amongst SSOs for the 
specification of future wireless communications standards is not a new 
phenomenon, and has been observed on myriad occasions (CDMA v 
GSM).72  But patent-policy driven competition amongst SSOs for the 
attraction of technology developers would be an unprecedented 
development.  To date, no such effect can yet be observed, but it might be 
worth looking at the impact of SSPU+ on the locus of standardization in the 
future, to see whether our intuitions can be empirically confirmed.   
Last, firms may even reconsider their decision to invest into 
patentable technologies, participate in standard setting processes and exit 
the industry altogether.  But those are largely empirical and prospective 
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